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Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether framing an individual-choice decision in 
a market setting results in a different outcome than when the decision is described in a 
context-free frame. We further explore whether the context effect is triggered by the frame 
itself or whether a richer descriptive content is required to establish familiarity with the 
decision-making environment. Understanding what constitutes context is central to 
formulating practical recommendations aiming to improve the quality of individual 
decisions. Our results show that framing a sequential search problem as selling houses leads 
to better decisions than a context-free frame. Manipulating whether or not the framed 
decision-making scenario includes a description of the house, which would be naturally 
available in a real estate market, does not impact the length of search or the total earnings.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Economic rationality can often be observed in social and economic institutions that 
provide interactive experience within a particular context in which the decisions are made 
(see Plott 1987; Smith, 1962 and 1991). However, a large fraction of individual decision-
making experiments testing for rationality is context free and employs neutral framing. At 
the same time, empirical evidence points out that decisions, whether in an individual or 
strategic setting, are sensitive to framing (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; McNeil, Pauker, 
Sox & Tversky, 1982; Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987) and that embedding a decision-making 
problem in a context can improve the quality of decisions (e.g., Eger & Dickhaut, 1982; 
Griggs & Cox, 1982).1 The ability to make better decisions in context can be explained by 
the dual-processing theory. Dual-processing theory proposes that most daily decisions are 
made by associating a new situation with existing knowledge in similar experiences, rather 
than forming new knowledge and information for each new experience (Kahneman, 2003). 
People use existing schemas that contain effective strategies constructed from previous 
experiences to make decisions. A schema is a system of organizing and perceiving new 
information, which is then encoded as default assumptions about the world. Schemas form 
mental structures that describe how the world works, and how we interact with the world 
(see Bower & Cirilo, 1985; Dimaggio, 1997; Narvaez & Bock, 2002, for more details).2 For 
instance, when someone holds a schema that maximizing profit is the best approach to make 
decisions, she will consistently re-apply this schema in various economic situations. Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1995) and Jehiel (2005) propose arguments related to schema activation 
that effective contexts work through memory cues from past experience. People with 
existing experience in the presented context can evoke this past experience to guide their 
behavior in the current task.  
Since in everyday life virtually all decisions are made within a context, it is crucial 
to understand the link between the amount of information needed in a context in order to 
activate a schema and change the behavior. We study whether framing an individual-choice 
decision in a market setting results in a different outcome than when the decision is described 
in a neutral (context-free) frame. We further explore whether schema activation is triggered 
by the frame itself or whether a richer descriptive content is required to establish familiarity 
with the decision-making environment in order to activate the schema. Understanding what 
constitutes context is central to formulating practical recommendations aiming to improve 
the quality of individual decisions. It is important to note that certain contexts cannot be 
created or easily replicated in the lab, however one can frame (label) the decision and 
                                                 
1 See also Kay & Ross (2003), Rege & Telle (2004), Liberman, Samuels, & Ross (2004), Hennig-Schmidt, 
Sadrieh, & Rockenbach (2010), Dufwenberg, Gächter, & Hennig-Schmidt (2011), Ellingsen, Johannesson, 
Mollerstrom, & Munkhammar (2012) for more examples of decisions being sensitive to framing. 
2 Note that the literature implicitly assumes that the “correct” schema is activated, which then in turns improves 
the quality of decisions. In our study we will be able to verify this assumption by observing and evaluating the 
quality of decisions through the lens of a particular theory.  
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provide additional information about the environment to invoke a particular context and 
enhance the link between the laboratory and every day life decision-making.3 
We explore our questions in a sequential search task, known as the secretary problem 
(Gardner, 1960), in which individuals decide whether to accept the presented offer or 
whether to keep searching for a better one. Within this setting we frame the decisions as 
selling houses and manipulate whether or not the decision-making scenario includes a 
description of the house, which would be naturally available in a real estate market. Note 
that, in reality, buying or selling a house do often follow the processes of secretary problem. 
The experimental design ensures that at no stage our participants receive information 
regarding the distribution of offers or the optimal (= highest) offer, which is crucial for a 
clean identification of the source of decision variation. Our findings show that decisions 
framed as selling houses, irrespectively of whether house descriptions are available or not, 
result in higher earnings and are closer to the optimal amount of search (approximated by 
numerical methods) than neutrally-framed (and thus context-free) decisions. Our experiment 
thus provides evidence that schema can be activated solely with framing and that no 
additional descriptive information is necessary. 
The contribution of our study also has a methodological aspect. For certain research 
questions in social sciences and economics in particular, the lack of context in subject 
instructions is desirable as the sole focus on induced values leads to more control over the 
data generating process than simulating alleged circumstances would (Smith, 1976). Using 
loaded language and engaging participants in “roleplay,” runs the risk that home-grown 
values and preconceived notions of how one “should” behave in a given emotionally-
charged scenario will dominate the pecuniary incentives (see Cox & Oaxaca, 1989 and 
Friedman & Sunder, 1994 for a discussion; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat & Smith, 1994 and 
Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996 for early experimental studies framing ultimatum game 
and dictator game decisions as market interactions; and Alekseev, Charness & Gneezy, 2017 
for a survey of using contextual instructions in economics experiments). At the same time, 
it is crucial to recognize that the lack of context itself might result in loss of control, for 
example when comparing the behavior of participants from different populations and 
attributing the observed difference to “culture” or “group preferences,” without properly 
understanding the context that the subjects might self-impose to help them interpret the 
experimental scenario and incentives. Ultimately, whether context enhances or diminishes 
control depends on the research question and deciding whether or not to implement it or not 
is an important design issue. Our main methodological contribution to this debate stems 
from our observation that framing itself is sufficient to generate context in an individual 
                                                 
3 There appears to be a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the difference between the context and 
framing effect, with some authors using the two terms interchangeably. In the current paper, we refer to 
decisions being made in a particular context and this context could be experienced in a natural setting or 
introduced by framing. We use the term “context effect” when behavior changes due to a change in context in 
which the decision is made. In our experiment, such a change is caused by framing. 
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decision-making environment and providing evidence that a house-selling frame results in 
longer search and higher payoffs. We investigate this hypothesis by employing a context 
that few of our participants had past experience with: selling houses. We argue that a context 
that has (likely) never been experienced can still improve decisions and facilitate learning 
by activating schema created from “similar” contexts experienced in our daily lives.  
 
2 RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE  
Many decision-making situations are sequential in life; such decisions often need to 
be made immediately and in certain instances cannot be revisited. This type of sequential 
decision-making situation displays the features of the secretary problem.4 The classical 
secretary problem has been specified in the following way (Gardner & Mathematical 
Association of America, 2009). A known number of n candidates is presented randomly in 
a sequence. The decision-maker must either accept or reject the presented candidate 
immediately and the decision cannot be recalled.5 A positive payoff is earned only if she 
chooses the best overall candidate. The optimal decision rule of the classical version of the 
secretary problem allows the decision-maker to maximize the probability of finding the best 
candidate. The decision rule states that the decision-maker should reject the first n/e (≈0.37 
as n approaches infinity) of the candidates and then accept a candidate who is better than 
any of the previously rejected candidates (see Lindley, 1961; Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966 for 
a detailed proof). The chance of finding the best candidate increases to approximately 58% 
as n approaches infinity (Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966) when the distribution of the quality of 
candidates is available and known. However, often it is not and must be inferred during the 
process itself.   
In Gilbert and Mosteller (1966), the decision rule is based on assuming that only the 
relative (ordinal) rank of each candidate is known, rather the objective (cardinal) value of 
each candidate. There exist also other variations of how payoffs in the secretary problem are 
calculated; e.g. in Seale & Rapoport (1997) only the best choice results in a positive payoff 
whereas in Bearden et al. (2006) payoffs are dependant on rank. Teodorescu, Sang, and Todd 
(2018) implement objective values in an experiment and point out their several advantages, 
namely the ecological validity and the ability of researchers to observe the learning effect as 
well as behavioral strategies for different values associated with candidates. Angelovski and 
Güth (2019) use dynamic modelling to calculate the optimal decision rule for objective 
values when the distribution is known. In a subsequent experiment they then find that people 
stop searching too early. Early stopping behavior is actually a frequent finding in 
experiments on the variation of the secretary problem (e.g. Zwick, Rapoport, Lo & 
                                                 
4 The secretary problem was first published in February 1960 Scientific American of Martin Gardner column 
of mathematical games. According to Gardner, it was originally devised in 1958 by John Fox of the 
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company and Gerald Marnie of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and called the game of googol. See Ferguson (1989) and Freeman (1983) for historical reviews. 
5 Recall in the current paper refers to the ability to withdraw any previously made decision. 
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Muthukrishnan, 2003). While many of these experiments frame the decisions in a particular 
context (e.g., interviewing candidates for a position or search for new apartments) and 
present a specific content (e.g., relative rank of the current candidate with respect to the 
already interviewed candidates or the relative rank of the current apartment and the 
probability of successfully recalling a previously rejected apartment), we are unaware of any 
studies explicitly exploring whether framing exacerbates or alleviates early stopping 
behavior.  
Cox and Oaxaca (1989) investigate a context-free job search problem that could be 
considered a variant of the secretary problem with multiple relaxed assumptions. In 
particular, in their experiment the participants are informed about the distribution of offers 
prior to making decisions, and use search with replacements, meaning that the same draw 
can re-appear in later search. While this reduces the complexity of the search task, Cox and 
Oaxaca still report early stopping behavior in their experiment. Although their paper 
discusses the importance of avoiding emotive terms in a sequential job search task (for their 
research question), the study does not include a context treatment that would permit a 
conclusion as to whether sequential search is influenced by context. 
A type of context effect – the order in which the offers are presented – is 
experimentally investigated by Corbin, Olson and Abbondanza (1975) in the classical 
secretary problem. Corbin et al. (1975) show that the probability of finding the highest offer 
is influenced by how the offers are presented and also by the size of the offers experienced 
in the sequence. People are more likely to find the highest offer in an initial decrease 
followed by an increase pattern than in a monotonically increasing pattern. People are also 
more likely to find the highest offer when experiencing a large range of offers than small or 
medium range. This earlier research therefore suggests that the quality of sequential search 
decisions might be susceptible to how the offers are presented.  
Finally, in a study related to ours, Palley and Kremer (2014) investigate the effect of 
rank feedback when the secretary problem is framed as real property agents searching for an 
apartment. Palley and Kremer find that when the actual value of each offer and the 
distribution of offers are presented, people search more than when only the relative rank is 
available. Therefore, the amount of information available may potentially influence the 
length of search.  
 
DIFFERENT DECISIONS UNDER DIFFERENT CONTEXT FRAMES 
The human brain is often thought to be the result of an evolutionary process to 
resolve problems and enhance survival (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). The brain enables a 
collection of cognitive mechanisms that guide our behavior and decision-making. As 
suggested by schema activation, invoking a particular context while making a decision is 
possibly one of these mechanisms. In fact, in a recent study Thunström, Cherry, McEvoy 
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and Shogren (2016) find that people actively seek out richer context to facilitate their 
decisions in the dictator game. Ample empirical evidence also shows that framing a 
decision-making problem in a particular context might result in different choices from a 
context-free (neutral) frame. 
A long line of research has found that decisions change under different frames (e.g., 
Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Duchon, Dunegan & Barton, 1989; Gamliel & Peer, 2010). An early 
study of the issue is that of Kahneman and Tversky (1984), who explore how different 
phrasing with the same outcome affected people’s preference in hypothetical life-and-death 
decision-making scenarios. The decision is presented to participants either with positive 
framing, for example, 2 of 3 people would die or with negative framing, 1 of 3 people would 
live. They find that although the outcome is the same in both scenarios, a decision made 
with the positively framed scenario often differed from that made with the negatively framed 
one. 
Dual-processing theory has been proposed to explain why different decisions result 
from how the problem is framed (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Evans, 2008), emphasizing that the 
decision-making process relies on both intuitive/heuristic and analytic/executive processes. 
System one involves implicit (subconscious) processing that uses intuitive and heuristic 
forms of reasoning that operate in most of our everyday reasoning and decision-making. It 
is a domain-specific and contextualised, fast, and automatic responding requires very little 
effort. System two involves explicit (conscious) processing; these analytic/executive 
operations tend to be slow, controlled, serial, and effortful (De Neys, 2006). The context 
effect can be caused by different decision-making schemas belonging to system one.  
Some schemas are activated chronically due to the regular contact with 
environmental context (Freeman, 2007). For example, when an individual learns from 
repeatedly looking for a car-parking space that is closest to the destination, she learns that a 
certain way facilitates finding the best parking space, and other ways do not. These schemas 
are activated involuntarily. They are formed from previous experiences and are then used to 
organize or integrate new information (see Bower & Cirilo, 1985; Dimaggio, 1997; Narvaez 
& Bock, 2002, for a more detailed discussion on schemas). Once schemas are formed, they 
operate constantly in the brain and are activated by stimuli that resemble the stimuli that 
were present when the schema was first created (Higgins & Chaires, 1980; also see Narvaez, 
& Bock, 2002). To return to the previous search example if the experiences of finding car-
parking spaces couple with experiences in searching for the best car to buy within a given 
price range, the brain may form a fuller mental model of how to make sequential search 
decisions generally. This may then be activated when a similar situation, for example, 
finding an apartment, arises. Heider and Simmel (1944) find evidence to support the 
hypothesis of re-applying existing schema to explain a new experience. In their experiment, 
the participants watch a short animated film. The film has a motionless large square with a 
door that opens and closes in one side. First, a big triangle appeared inside the square, then 
a small triangle and circle appeared. As the door flapped open and shut, the geometric figures 
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slid around the screen. After ninety seconds or so, the small triangle and the small circle 
disappeared, and the big triangle breaks down the big square.6  
After the participants watch the animated film, they are asked to describe what they 
saw. Only 3 of 114 participants report seeing geometric shapes moving around a screen. The 
majority report a narrative and attribute agency and intent to the shapes: for example, a 
romance story between the small triangle and the small circle, the big triangle is the angry 
parent who wants to separate them, and so on. This experiment demonstrates that people can 
explain a new situation using a similar, existing mental structure or schema. Although people 
may feel they are experiencing novelty every day, the novelty is perceived and interpreted 
by existing schemas without consciously being processed by the brain (Wegner & 
Wheathey, 1999).  
 
EVIDENCE OF MAKING BETTER DECISIONS WITH CONTEXT  
Just as a schema can be activated through the same or a similar stimulus encountered 
in previous experiences, making decisions in a context allows us to effectively resolve 
problems and make decisions without starting from scratch every time. For example, 
experimentation on the Wason selection task, testing deductive reasoning. demonstrates how 
context enhances people's ability to solve problems. In the Wason selection a set of four 
cards is placed on a table, where each card has a number on one side and a letter on the other 
side. The visible faces of the cards show A, D, 4 and 7. Which card(s) must be turned over 
in order to test whether the proposition that if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an 
even number on the other side, is true?  
Only 5 % of the participants are able to solve the context-free problem correctly 
(Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970). A drastic increase in correct answers is reported in versions 
involving a social exchange to detect cheaters (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides et al., 2010) 
and cross-cultural experiments with the SchiWiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia (Sugiyama et 
al., 2002). Griggs and Cox (1982) report that when people are asked to solve the Wason 
problem as a drinking-age problem, 73% of them are able to solve it correctly, suggesting 
that in some instances context aids understanding of the task and reduces confusion among 
partipants. In this form of the problem, the task framed the problem as a police officer who 
is ensuring drinking-age regulations are being followed in a bar. The participants are 
presented with 4 cards, each with information about one person in a bar. One side of a card 
tells a person's age and on the other side is what the person is drinking. The task is to identify 
the card(s) that violate this rule: If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 
19 years of age.  
                                                 
6 The complete film can be watched on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTNmLt7QX8E . 
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Pollard and Evans (1987) argue that two different aspects that change between the 
context-free problem and the context-framed problem can potentially contribute to better 
performance. For example, the drinking-age problem provides content (drinks and age), as 
well as the context or scenario (policeman checking patrons’ age in a bar), within which this 
content is relevant. Pollard and Evans demonstrate that both the relevant content and context  
are necessary to facilitate an increase in accurate responses. However, they suggest that 
context may be a stronger contributor to people’s performance than content, a claim our 
experiment is able to verify by observing the marginal effect caused by providing additional 
informational content on the top of framing. There are two other major differences between 
our experiment and that of Pollard and Evans. First, Pollard and Evans employ a reasoning 
task while our experiment employs a sequential search task. Second, in Pollard and Evans 
the participants are not incentivized for their performance, whereas the decisions in our 
experiment have monetary consequences.7 Economic experiments also demonstrate that 
context affects incentivized behavior. Alekseev et al. (2017) survey the literature and come 
to the conclusion that context often but not invariably improves performance with the 
improvement being more likely if the task requires sophisticated reasoning. (While the 
survey did not contain any secretary problem studies, the task seems to qualify as requiring 
sophisticated reasoning.)  
Our contribution to this line of research stems from varying the amount of context 
provided which is critical to our understanding of schema activation. The aforementioned 
study by Thunström et al. (2016) suggests that people endogenously seek information which 
then in turn alters their behavior. A richer descriptive information may potentially be more 
effective in activating the appropriate schema and facilitating better quality decisions. Thus, 
apart from extending the analysis of context effects to the area of sequential search, our 
study addresses a previously unexplored link between the amount of information necessary 
to generate a context effect. In what follows, we experimentally identify whether framing 
itself is capable of improving search decisions or whether a richer description of the 
environment aids people to extend their search closer to the optimal level.8   
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
We design an experiment to analyze the effect of context on sequential search 
activity in the secretary problem in which the participants earn payoffs based on the offers 
                                                 
7 It is important to note that not all contexts have a positive effect on performance and learning. For example, 
embedding the Wason selection task in the contexts of city transportation, and stamps on letters did not improve 
accuracy (Griggs & Cox, 1982). Cooper, Kagel, Lo and Gu (1999) suggest that for the context to facilitate 
understanding and learning, the context needs to be relevant to the task and familiar to the participants (e.g., 
college students may be more familiar with the drink and age context than the letter and stamp context). 
8 Naturally, we also verify whether the change in behavior, if any, is an improvement or deterioration of the 
quality of decisions. 
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they accept.9 In particular, we identify whether framing of sequential search as selling 
houses results in different behavior than when the search is described in a context-free 
manner and whether a richer descriptive content is required to generate the context effect.  
An important feature of our experiment is employing a context that likely only few of our 
participants (if any, due to their age) had past experience with. The experiment therefore 
presents a conservative test of our hypotheses. If we observe that a context that has never 
been experienced can still improve decisions by activating schema created from similar 
market contexts of being a seller, employing a context that one has direct experience with is 
likely to yield even a stronger effect. 
The experiment consists of three treatments implemented in an across-subject 
design: No Frame, House Frame, and House Frame with Info. There is no monetary search 
cost. The offers are presented in experimental currency units with the exchange rate of 1000 
ECU = 1 NZD, announced at the beginning of the experiment. The experiment, programmed 
and conducted with zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007), consists of 2 practice rounds and 
10 cumulatively paid rounds. In each round, there are 20 available offers, distribution of 
which is unknown to participants. The offers are identical across the three treatments (see 
Table 1 for details). Each sequence of offers, including those in the practice rounds, was 
generated in MS Excel by randomly sampling from an interval of the average house price 
(in thousands of NZD) in a different Christchurch suburb plus/minus the standard deviation 
for that suburb.10 The house transactions took place in October 2014. The transaction 
information was obtained from the Quotable Value Ltd. database (qv.co.nz). 
 
  
                                                 
9 In contrast to the classical secretary problem (see Ferguson, 1989 for a discussion), which assumes people 
derive utility only from the optimal choice (i.e., the highest offer), our experiment allows the participants to 
earn money also from sub-optimal choices (see Bearden, Rapoport, & Murphy, 2006 for more details). That 
is, participants earn money in the experiment based on the actual value of the offer they accept, instead of zero 
payoffs when anything other than the highest offer is selected.  
10 Randbetween (lowerlimit, upperlimit). 
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Table 1: Price offer sequences implemented in the experiment.  
Variable Sequence optimal Predicted optimal Min. Average 
offer 
Std. D. 
Round Position Offer Position Offer 
1 8 848 8 848 276 509.6 165.4 
2 10 875 8 818 2 469.15 284.4 
3 10 708 10 708 207 437.6 147.2 
4 20 733 20 733 267 518.5 145.5 
5 13 578 10 484 186 331.15 114.4 
6 10 1574 9 1400 89 714.25 447.4 
7 19 581 19 581 197 369.2 128.1 
8 3 966 20 541 250 636.4 234.4 
9 14 1740 12 1264 105 756.4 396.2 
10 4 625 20 553 250 440.4 101.3 
Average 11.1 922.8 13.6 793.0 183 518.3 216.4 
Notes: Sequence optimal position = the position with the highest price in the implemented sequence, see 
Appendix B for details; Sequence optimal offer = the highest offer value in each round, see Appendix B for 
details; Predicted optimal position = the stopping position predicted by the optimal decision rule (the decision 
rule which yields the highest earning), see Appendix C for details; Predicted optimal offer = the offer at the 
position predicted by the optimal decision rule, see Appendix C for details. Min. = the lowest offer in each 
round. Average offer = the average offer in the implemented sequence for each round. Std. D. = the standard 
deviation of 20 price offers in each round.  
The participants in the No Frame treatment receive the following instructions about 
their task. Note that there is no mention of a house, its description, or any additional 
information. The full instructions are provided in Appendix A.1. 
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether 
to accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer and 
available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If 
you accept the number, you receive the amount represented by the number (in experimental 
currency units, as will be explained below). All decisions are final. If you reject the number, 
the number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected number. In total 
there are 20 numbers available; if you have not accepted a number prior to the 20th number, 
you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) number. 
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In the House Frame treatment, the task is framed as selling houses, but no additional 
information about houses is provided.  
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each 
scenario, you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular 
house. You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of 
price offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at 
a time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the 
price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject 
the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. 
In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer 
prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, 
make your decisions carefully. There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be 
available for, so take as long as you need to evaluate each offer. 
Finally, the House Frame with Info treatment employs identical instructions to the 
House Frame one. The only difference between these two treatments is that in the House 
Frame with Info treatment a description of a house, consisting of the floor area, the number 
of bedrooms, suburb and year the house was built in, is presented prior to the price offer. 
Each round features a different house description. The house descriptions were also obtained 
from the Quotable Value database. 
We compare the participants’ decisions based on the stopping position and their total 
earnings. We assume that the participants are risk-neutral decision-makers who aim to 
maximize their expected payoffs. The first hypothesis, formulated with reference to 
experiments on the Wason selection task, is that people make better decisions when 
presented with a context than without. Theoretically, this would be because having a context 
allows one to better assess the situation and access existing schema constructed from a 
similar experience, for example, selling an object in everyday life. According to previous 
psychology research, when no context is available, the person might experience difficulty in 
determining what schema to apply and the chance of applying an inappropriate schema is 
increased. Assuming we replicate early stopping behavior in our experimental set up, we 
expect the House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments to produce higher total 
earnings and longer search than the No Frame treatment. 
Hypothesis 1: People search longer and obtain higher total earnings when decisions 
are framed as selling houses (both with and without additional information) than when they 
are framed neutrally.  
It is possible that having a fairly complete description of the house – for example, 
floor area, number of bedrooms, the year the house was built – is also critical in activating 
a useful schema. 
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We therefore expect participants to search longer and their total earnings to be higher 
in the House Frame with Info treatment than in the House Frame. 
Hypothesis 2: People search longer and obtain higher total earnings when decisions 
are framed as selling houses and more content-relevant information is available than when 
there is no such information.  
At the same time, we recognize that having to process additional information in the 
House Frame with Info treatment could be distracting to participants and might result in 
more noise. 
 
PROCEDURES AND PARTICIPANTS 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New 
Zealand. The payoff protocol was single-blind, meaning that the experimenter was able to 
match participant decisions to their identity. The participants were recruited via ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2015). After arriving at the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to a 
cubicle and read the instructions (provided in Appendix A.1 – 3) at their own pace. Any 
questions were answered in private. A total of 137 students participated in the experiment: 
46 in the No Frame treatment, 43 in House Frame, and 48 in House Frame with Info. A 
session lasted on average 45 minutes and the participants earned NZD 12.10 on average. 
 
4. SIMULATION  
What is the optimal decision rule for a payoff-maximizing risk-neutral decision-
maker in our variation of the secretary problem? Since the distribution of offers in our 
experiment is unknown to participants, we conduct a simulation that allows to evaluate the 
performance of different decision rules. Each simulation compares the payoffs resulting 
from 20 different decision rules (as there was a maximum of 20 offers; each decision rule 
prescribes how many offers to reject in order to learn about the distribution, followed by 
accepting the next highest offer), which contain all possible stopping positions (i.e., an 
individual stops the search by accepting the nth offer in a given sequence; where 1 ≤ n ≤ 20). 
Each simulation iteration generates a set of 20 random offers in the same way as the actual 
offers used in the experiment were generated. Once a set of offers has been generated, the 
offers are (implicitly) ordered from the highest to lowest and assigned a rank within this 
particular order. These offer values and the rank for each offer are recorded to test the 
performance of each decision rule. The simulation runs separately for each round with 1.2 
million iterations.  
We compare the performance of all 20 possible decision rules using both the average 
payoffs (in ECUs) they yield and the frequency of each decision rule finding the optimal 
offer (in %). The average payoff statistic indicates which decision rule yields the highest 
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payoff. The optimal offer frequency statistic shows which decision rule finds the optimal 
price offers most frequently.  
  
Figure 1. The average payoff for all decision rules. 
 
According to the simulation, the decision rule to “Accept the next highest offer after 
seeing 4 offers” yields the highest average payoff of 524.3 ECUs (see Figure 1). The 
decision rule “Accept the next highest offer after seeing 7 offers” finds the most optimal 
offers as presented in Figure 2, just as the optimal decision rule of the classical version of 
the secretary problem (20/e = 7.4 offers). However, the decision rule “Accept the next 
highest offer after seeing 7 offers” yields only 518.9 ECUs on average. The simulation thus 
indicates that, when any accepted offer generates a positive payoff (as opposed to only the 
best one as in the classical secretary problem) and the goal is to maximize the payoff, it 
might be better to stop the search sooner (i.e., accept an earlier offer) than prescribed by the 
solution to the classical secretary problem.11 
                                                 
11 If one were to implement only one decision rule to sell all 10 houses, the decision rule "Accept the next 
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Figure 2. The frequency of finding the optimal offer for all decision rules. 
 
5. RESULTS 
First, we describe the summary statistics and test our hypotheses. Then, we examine 
whether there is a repetition effect found in any of the treatments, namely whether 
participants make better decisions in the latter rounds than in the earlier rounds. Finally, we 
present correlation results between the amount of search and total earnings.  
There are two dependent variables: the amount of search exerted, i.e. the position in 
the sequence where the participant stops searching and accepts the offer (henceforth 
stopping position), and the amount of money the participant earned, i.e. the cumulative sum 
of 10 accepted offers in ECUs (henceforth total earnings). The summary statistics relating 
to these two dependent variables are presented in Table 2. 
                                                 
highest offer after seeing 7 offers" has the highest total earnings and “Accept the next highest offer after 
seeing 9 offers" finds the most optimal offers in the sequences used in our experiment (see Appendix C).  
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Table 2: Summary statistics and between treatments statistical tests. 
Panel A. Stopping position   
Average SD Tukey HSD Post 
Hoc test*** 
Analysis of Variance 
 
  p F 
(df) 
MS 
error 
p Partial 
ƞ2 
No 
Frame(1) 
9.8 3.6 0.07(2) 0.015(3) 4.3 
(2, 134) 
9.4 0.015 0.061 
House 
Frame(2) 
11.2 2.8 0.07(1) 0.86(3) 
      
House 
Frame with 
Info(3) 
11.6 2.8 0.015(1) 0.86(2) 
      
Sequence optimal* 11.1 
      
Predicted optimal** 13.6 
      
Panel B. Total earnings (ECU) 
 
Average SD Tukey HSD Post 
Hoc test*** 
Analysis of Variance 
 
  p  F 
(df) 
MS 
error 
p Partial 
ƞ2 
No 
Frame(1) 
6880.3 750.0 0.005(2) < 0.001(3) 8.1 
(2, 134) 
0.00003 < 0.001 0.11 
House 
Frame(2) 
7269.5 361.4 0.005(1) 0.84(3) 
     
House 
Frame with 
Info(3) 
7338.9 580.7 < 0.001(1) 0.84(2) 
      
Sequence optimal*  9228.0 
      
Predicted optimal**  7930.0 
      
*Sequence optimal refers to the actual optimal position/offer from the sequences implemented in the 
experiment.  
** The predicted result from applying the optimal decision rule to the sequences implemented in the 
experiment (see Appendix C for more detail). This serves as a benchmark only, not for a direct comparison to 
participants’ decisions.  
*** The result of Tukey HSD post hoc pairwise comparisons between two treatments; the small numbers in 
parentheses indicate the compared treatment. Notes: SD presents the standard deviation, df refers to the degree 
of freedom. 
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STOPPING POSITION 
Participants in No Frame stopped at a significantly earlier average position (M = 9.8) 
than in House Frame (M = 11.2) and House Frame with Info (M = 11.6). Tukey HSD post 
hoc tests show that the participants in the House Frame with Info treatment stop their search 
at a significantly later position than in the No Frame treatment (p = 0.015, hypothesis 1). 
The participants in the House Frame treatment stop their search at a later position than in 
the No Frame treatment, however the difference is only weakly statistically significant (p = 
0.07, hypothesis 1). There is no significant difference between House Frame and House 
Frame with Info (p = 0.86, hypothesis 2). The results are robust to using the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U test; see Appendix D for details.  
The participants therefore searched less in the No Frame treatment and on average 
stopped their search 1.3 positions prior to the sequence optimal position (M = 11.1); the 
sequence optimal position refers to the position with the highest price offer in the 
implemented sequence. The stopping positions in the House Frame and House Frame with 
Info treatments are on average 0.3 positions higher than the sequence optimal position. 
(Table 2 panel A).  
Result 1: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to more 
search than no frame. The house-description information has no effect on the amount of 
search when the task is framed as selling houses.  
 
TOTAL EARNINGS 
Participants in the House Frame with Info treatment had higher total earnings on 
average (M = 7338.9 ECUs) than participants in the House Frame treatment (M = 7269.5 
ECUs) and the No Frame treatment (M = 6880.3 ECUs). On average, participants in the 
House Frame with Info and House Frame treatments earned 79.5% and 78.8% of the 
maximum total earnings (which is the sum of the highest offers in each of the 10 rounds) 
respectively. Participants in the No Frame treatment earned on average 75.0% of the 
maximum total earnings. 
The analysis of variance show a significant main effect of treatment on the average 
total earnings, as presented in Table 2 Panel B. Tukey HSD post hoc tests confirm that the 
participants in the House Frame treatment received significantly higher total earnings than 
the participants in the No Frame treatment (p = 0.005, hypothesis 1). The participants in the 
House Frame with Info treatment also received higher total earnings than the participants in 
the No Frame treatment (p < 0.001, hypothesis 1). There is no significant difference in total 
earnings between the House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments (p = 0.84, 
hypothesis 2). All results are robust to using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test; see 
Appendix D for details. 
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Result 2: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to higher total 
earnings than no frame. The house-description information has no effect on the total earnings 
when the task is framed as selling houses. 
 
REPETITION EFFECT 
STOPPING POSITION 
To examine whether the performance of participants improves with experience, we 
contrast participants’ stopping positions in the first half of the session (rounds 1 – 5) with 
stopping positions in the second half of the session (rounds 6 – 10). We conduct a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with session halves (first vs. second) as a within-
subject factor and treatments (No Frame, House Frame, and House Frame with Info) as a 
between-subject factor. The analysis of variance results, averaged across treatments and 
presented in Table 3, show a significant main effect of session halves. Participants stopped 
significantly earlier in the second half (M = 9.8) than in the first half (M = 11.9) of the 
session. There is also a statistically significant (p = 0.007) interactive effect of the treatments 
and session halves.  
Tukey HSD post hoc tests show there is no significant difference between the No 
Frame and House Frame (p = 0.53), No Frame and House Frame with Info (p = 0.87), or 
House Frame and House with Info (p = 1.0) treatments in the first half of the session. There 
is also no significant difference between No Frame and House Frame (p = 0.23) or House 
Frame and House Frame with Info (p = 0.63) in the second half of the session. However, 
the participants in the House Frame with Info treatment stopped at a significantly later 
position than the participants in the No Frame treatment in the second half (p = 0.002) of 
the session. We also conducted the Mann-Whitney U tests to check for robustness; see 
Appendix D for details.12 Note that while the test does not detect a statistically shorter search 
in the No Frame treatment than in the House Frame treatment in either half, the overall 
effect of participants searching less in No Frame than in House Frame is weakly statistically 
significant (p = 0.07), as reported in the previous section.  
The comparison between the session halves may also be influenced by the actual 
sequence optimal position (there are five sequence optimal positions in each session half). 
The results show that participants in the No Frame treatment searched less (on average by 
                                                 
12 The Mann-Whitney U tests show similar results for all comparison in the first half session, but, find both 
House Frame and House Frame with Info stopped at a significantly later position than No Frame in the 
second half of session (House Frame and No Frame; p = 0.002, House Frame with Info and No Frame; p =  
< 0.001 respectively). The House Frame with Info also stopped significantly later than the House Frame in 
the second half of the session (p = 0.03); see Appendix D for details. 
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1.0 position) than the sequence optimal position in the first half and were even further away 
(on average by 1.6 positions less) from the sequence optimal position in the second half of 
the session.13 The participants in House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments 
stopped search closer to the sequence optimal position than in the No Frame treatment in 
both the first and second halves of the session, as shown in Figure 3, providing further 
evidence that framing improves the quality of search decisions. 
Result 3: The house-selling frame with information leads to more search than no 
frame in the latter rounds. The house selling frame without information and no frame yield 
similar amount of search throughout the entire session. Similarly, the house-description 
information has no effect on the amount of search throughout the entire session when the 
task is framed as selling-houses.  
 
Table 3: Summary of statistical findings for the session halves and treatments.  
  
Analysis of Variance   
F df MS 
error 
p Partial 
ƞ2 
Stopping 
position 
Session halves 61.0 1, 134 4.84 < 0.001 0.31 
 Interaction effect 
with treatments  
5.1 2, 134  0.007 0.07 
Total earnings Session halves 472.4 1, 134 53690 < 0.001 0.78 
 Interaction effect 
with treatments  
 
1.6 2, 134  0.21 0.02 
Note: df refers to the degree of freedom 
 
                                                 
13 The sequence optimal position in the first half was 12.2 and in the second half 10.0. 
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Figure 3. The average stopping position (averaged across participants) in the first half of 
the session (rounds 1 – 5) and the second half of the session (rounds 6 – 10) in the No 
Frame, House Frame, and House Frame with Info treatments compared to the sequence 
optimal position. 
 
TOTAL EARNINGS 
We next examine whether experience leads to higher total earnings. We compute the 
total earnings for each participant across the first half (rounds 1  –  5) and second half (rounds 
6  –  10) of the session and conduct a repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis detects a 
significant main effect of session halves in total earnings with participants decisions leading 
to higher total earnings in the second half of the session, but the interaction effect of the 
session halves and treatments is not significant (p = 0.21). The detailed results are presented 
in Table 3.  
Participants in the House Frame (first half: M = 3317.8; second half: M = 3951.7). 
and House with Info (first half: M = 3342.7; second half: M = 3996.2) treatments received 
higher earnings in both the first and second half of the session than No Frame (first half: M 
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= 3170.1; second half: M = 3710.2). Tukey HSD post hoc tests show a significant difference 
between the No Frame and House Frame (p = 0.001), No Frame and House Frame with 
Info (p = 0.006) in the second half, but not in the first half (No Frame and House Frame; p 
= 0.31, No Frame and House Frame with Info; p = 0.13, respectively) of the session. There 
is also no significant difference found between the House Frame and House with info 
treatments in either the first (p = 1.0) or the second half (p = 1.0) of the session. The Mann-
Whitney U tests are also conducted to check for robustness; refer to Appendix D for details.14 
The results are graphically presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The average total earnings (averaged across participants) in the first half (rounds 
1 – 5) and second half (rounds 6 – 10) of the session in the No Frame, House Frame, and 
House Frame with Info treatments, compared to the sequence optimal offer. 
                                                 
14 The Mann-Whitney U tests show that participants in House Frame and House Frame with Info received 
significantly higher earnings than participants in No Frame in the first half (House Frame and No Frame; p = 
0.03, House Frame with Info and No Frame; p = 0.001, respectively) as well as in the second half of the session 
(p = 0.003, p < 0.001, respectively). The earnings in House Frame and House Frame with Info in both the first 
(p = 0.14) and second half (p = 0.29) of the session are not statistically significantly different. See Appendix 
D for details. 
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Result 4: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to higher total 
earnings than no frame in the latter rounds. The house-description information has no effect 
on total earnings in the entire session when the task is framed as selling houses.  
 
PEARSON CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
We use Pearson correlation analysis to examine the relationship between the average 
stopping positions, the total earnings, and the optimal offer frequency. The average stopping 
position is obtained by averaging the 10 actual stopping position for each participant. The 
total earnings are calculated for each participant by adding up the 10 offers she accepted. 
The optimal offer frequency shows the percentage of accepting the optimal offer (out of all 
accepted offers) by a participant.  
Unsurprisingly, we find a positive significant correlation between the frequency in 
which the optimal offer is accepted and the total earnings for all three treatments (r = 0.57, 
p < 0.001). This is expected because the optimal offer is the highest offer in each round. 
Accepting the optimal offer in more rounds will therefore result in higher total earnings. 
There is a large positive and significant correlation between the length of search and the size 
of the accepted offer (r = 0.61, p < 0.001), as well as the frequency of accepted optimal 
offers (r = 0.24, p = 0.005). The longer the participants search, the more often they accept 
the optimal offers.Also, the longer the participants search, the higher are their total earnings. 
However, an individual correlation analysis for each treatment shows that the correlation 
between the search length and the size of the accepted offer is statistically significant only 
for the No Frame and House Frame with Info treatments (No Frame, r = 0.77, p < 0.001; 
House Frame with Info, r = 0.56, p < 0.001, respectively), while for the House Frame 
treatment the correlation is not statistically significant (r = 0.12, p = 0.40). Only in the No 
Frame treatment there is a significant correlation between the length of search and the 
frequency of accepted optimal offers (r = 0.54, p < 0.001); the same correlations in the House 
Frame (r = .− 0.02, p = 0.88) and House with Info (r = 0.02, p = 0.90) treatments are not 
statistically significant. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
This study extends the empirical analysis of context effects to the domain of 
sequential search where the implemented task was framed as selling houses. We further 
contribute to the literature by exploring the link between the amount of information 
necessary to generate the context effect. Using a conservative experimental design, we show 
that even a context which only few of our participants were likely to have had past 
experience with can result in improved decisions.  
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The experiment confirms the hypothesis that the participants search longer and 
accept higher offers when the house selling frame is introduced as an experimental 
manipulation (hypothesis 1). This result is consistent with the conjecture that having a 
context can activate existing schemas that enhance decision-making ability, as previously 
found in reasoning task experiments. At the same time, we do not find an effect of providing 
additional context-specific information on participants decisions; framing itself appears to 
be sufficient to activate the relevant schema (hypothesis 2).  
Previous research finds that people search more when less information is available 
(see e.g. Palley & Kremer, 2014 for evidence when the distribution of offers is known). 
However, this is not what we find in our data. There are at least two potential underlying 
causes for observing less search in a context-free setting. First, without a context, system 
one is unable to effectively associate a new experience with existing knowledge and 
strategies that the decision-maker has obtained from past experiences in a similar situation. 
This means that our participants might be forming their search strategy through trial and 
error, which is supported by higher standard deviations in the No Frame treatment. Second, 
it is possible that, without context, people are applying an inappropriate schema, an 
explanation potentially relevant from the methodological perspective as a large fraction of 
economics experiments is conducted without framing and in a context-free setting. It is not 
entirely clear whether participants always apply their own framing in such situations 
(Thunström et al., 2016 provide evidence for the dictator game), which could potentially 
lead to a loss of control over the data generating process. Whether people indeed apply their 
preferred framing to context-free tasks and whether the frequency of own-framing adoption 
interacts with certain design features, such as the complexity of the task, clearly deserves 
further investigation as it has fundamental methodological implications.  
It is important to keep in mind the limitations of our study. Our experiment adopts a 
house-selling context to explore schema activation. As there is no general theory explaining 
the effect of context on decision-making, it is unknown what type of framing one should use 
to achieve a particular outcome, for example, to improve people’s decisions to obtain higher 
earnings. From that perspective, the results of a house-selling frame may not generalize to 
other contexts, such as to the context of buying houses, or selling or buying cars. While the 
issues of whether context and framing effects carry over from one environment to another 
or whether they are task specific are outside the scope of our research question, we view 
them as promising future areas of research.  
To conclude, our research adds to the existing literature on the importance of context 
in decision-making (e.g. Alekseev et al. 2017). Our results extend the range of tasks 
requiring sophisticated reasoning, performance in which is improved by adding context, to 
include the secretary problem. Our results also show that once context is established, 
providing additional information in order to strengthen it does not appear to be critical.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NO FRAME TREATMENT 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your 
cell-phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in 
the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether to 
accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer and 
available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If 
you accept the number, you receive the amount represented by the number (in 
experimental currency units, as will be explained below). All decisions are final. If you 
reject the number, the number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously 
rejected number. In total there are 20 numbers available; if you have not accepted a 
number prior to the 20th number, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) 
number. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
 
There is no time limit on how long the numbers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each number. 
 
Practice rounds 
There will be two practice rounds. These practice rounds are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two 
practice rounds. 
 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you 
leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn. 
 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
30 
 
Accepted number for Round 1 + Accepted number for Round 2 + ….+ Accepted number 
for Round 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the number 450 for Round 1, 260 for Round 2, 380 for 
Round 3….., 658 for Round 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice rounds, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 rounds with money payoffs.  
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A.2 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE HOUSE FRAME TREATMENT  
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your 
cellphone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in 
the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular 
house. You will be given a series of price offers for each scenario.The price offers are 
randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price offer is 
presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will 
be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer 
will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 
price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th 
offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your 
decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you 
leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted price 
offer for House 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 
payoffs.   
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A.3 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE HOUSE FRAME WITH INFO TREATMENT  
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your 
cellphone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in 
the experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular 
house. You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series 
of price offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available 
one at a time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you 
accept the price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. 
If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously 
rejected offer. In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not 
accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the 
final) offer. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you 
leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted price 
offer for House 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 
payoffs.   
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APPENDIX B.  
Table 4. The actual price offers sequences used in the experiment 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Offer 
   1 388 739 310 420 292 494 522 252 789 341 
   2 488 803 290 637 264 225 252 709 829 459 
   3 683 221 637 727 344 272 562 966 996 453 
   4 321 729 372 561 266 994 255 885 241 625 
   5 625 159 619 643 396 602 370 737 799 504 
   6 744 150 207 663 445 987 292 449 722 387 
   7 279 299 455 568 266 523 533 910 1088 250 
   8 848 818 400 636 241 683 237 250 876 308 
   9 276 585 251 422 370 1400 262 933 503 492 
   10 678 875 708 336 484 1574 343 491 650 455 
   11 408 130 452 414 264 1413 220 450 890 353 
   12 435 795 516 479 186 184 460 394 1264 588 
   13 679 481 420 332 578 1081 294 899 645 438 
   14 465 2 607 494 244 558 535 372 1740 408 
   15 393 525 410 546 189 273 297 505 1179 481 
   16 397 429 324 724 565 1182 452 608 250 467 
   17 588 62 214 411 271 305 284 827 840 418 
   18 358 459 480 267 235 661 436 712 272 273 
   19 644 748 463 357 350 785 581 838 449 554 
   20 495 374 617 733 373 89 197 541 105 553 
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APPENDIX C.  
Table 5. Summary of predicted results for three dependent variables after applying different 
decision rules to the sequences used in the experiment.  
                                      Variable Total 
earnings 
(ECUs) 
Optimal offer 
frequency 
(%) 
Average 
stopping 
position 
Decision rule    
Accept the first offer 4547 0 1 
Accept the next highest after seeing 1 6629 0 2.6 
Accept the next highest after seeing 2 7352 20 3.7 
Accept the next highest after seeing 3 7228 40 10.3 
Accept the next highest after seeing 4 7562 30 12.4 
Accept the next highest after seeing 5 7611 30 12.5 
Accept the next highest after seeing 6 7754 40 13.1 
Accept the next highest after seeing 7 7930 40 13.6 
Accept the next highest after seeing 8 7634 40 15 
Accept the next highest after seeing 9 7808 50 15.1 
Accept the next highest after seeing 10 5825 30 18.4 
Accept the next highest after seeing 11 5825 30 18.4 
Accept the next highest after seeing 12 6301 40 18.6 
Accept the next highest after seeing 13 6096 30 19.3 
Accept the next highest after seeing 14 4461 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 15 4461 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 16 4461 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 17 4461 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 18 4461 20 19.9 
Accept the last offer 4077 10 20 
Notes: The total earnings (in ECUs) is the sum of the 10 price offers accepted by applying each decision rule. 
The optimal offer frequency is obtained by adding the number of rounds in which each decision rule finds the 
optimal offer (out of 10 rounds). The average stopping position is obtained by averaging the final stopping 
position (i.e. the offer accepted) across 10 rounds.   
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APPENDIX D.  
Table 6: Summary of statistical tests for the comparisons between the No Frame and House 
Frame, No Frame and House Frame with Info, and House Frame and House Frame with 
Info treatments.  
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Panel A. No Frame and House Frame 
Variables Treatments Average Mann-Whitney 
  
(Standard 
Deviation) 
U p 
Average stopping 
position  
(round 1 – 10) 
No Frame 9.8 793.5 0.11 
 
(3.56)   
House Frame 11.2   
 
(2.8)   
Total earnings 
(round 1 – 10) 
No Frame 6880.3 649.5 0.005 
 
(750.0)   
House Frame 7269.5   
 
(361.4)   
First half average 
stopping position  
(round 1 – 5) 
No Frame 11.2 888.5 0.41 
 
(5.0)   
House Frame 12.5   
 
(3.6)   
Second half 
average stopping 
position 
(round 6 – 10) 
No Frame 8.4 618.0 0.002 
 
(2.6)   
House Frame 10.0   
 
(2.7)   
First half total 
earnings  
(round 1 – 5) 
No Frame 3170.1 720.0 0.03 
 
(355.0)   
House Frame 3317.8   
 
(154.3)   
Second half total 
earnings 
(round 6 – 10) 
No Frame 3710.2 627.5 0.003 
 
(429.2)   
House Frame 3951.7   
 
(314.4)   
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Panel B. No Frame and House Frame with Info 
Variables Treatments Average Mann-Whitney 
  
(Standard 
Deviation) 
U P 
Average stopping 
position  
(round 1-10) 
 
No Frame 9.8 780.5 0.014 
 
(3.6)   
House Frame with Info 11.6   
 
(2.8)   
Total earnings 
(round 1-10) 
 
No Frame 6880.3 602.5 < 0.001 
 
(750.0)   
House Frame with Info 7338.9   
 
(580.7)   
First half average 
stopping position  
(round 1 – 5) 
No Frame 11.2 1078.0 0.85 
 
(5.0)   
House Frame with Info 12.0   
 
(3.0)   
Second half 
average stopping 
position 
(round 6 – 10) 
No Frame 8.4 487.5 < 0.001 
 
(2.6)   
House Frame with Info 11.1   
 
(3.3)   
First half total 
earnings  
(round 1 – 5) 
No Frame 3170.1 680.0 0.001 
 
(355.0)   
House Frame with Info 3342.7   
 
(238.3)   
Second half total 
earnings 
(round 6 – 10) 
No Frame 3710.2 627.5 < 0.001 
 
(429.2)   
House Frame with Info 3996.2   
 
(431.2)   
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Panel C. House Frame and House Frame with Info 
Variables Treatments Average Mann-whitney 
  
(Standard 
Deviation) 
U p 
Average stopping 
position 
(round 1-10) 
 
House Frame 11.2 930.0 0.42 
 
(2.8)   
House Frame with Info 11.6   
 
(2.8)   
Total earnings 
(round 1-10) 
 
House Frame 7269.5 868.0 0.19 
 
(361.4)   
House Frame with Info 7338.9   
 
(580.7)   
First half average 
stopping position  
(round 1 – 5) 
House Frame 12.5 939.1 0.74 
 
(3.6)   
House Frame with Info 12.0   
 
(3.0)   
Second half average 
stopping position 
(round 6 – 10) 
House Frame 10.0 735.5 0.03 
 
(2.7)   
House Frame with Info 11.12   
 
(3.3)   
First half total 
earnings  
(round 1 – 5) 
House Frame 3317.8 848.0 0.14 
 
(154.3)   
House Frame with Info 3342.7   
 
(238.3)   
Second half total 
earnings 
(round 6 – 10) 
House Frame 3951.7 899.0 0.29 
 
(314.7)   
House Frame with Info 3996.17   
 
(431.2)   
 
